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The Value of Cryptocurrencies: How
Bitcoin Fares in the Pockets of Federal and
State Courts
Brandon M. Peck*
A recent Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida decision has
raised concerns over how both federal and state courts consider
the unregulated cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. In State of Florida v.
Michell Abner Espinoza, Judge Teresa Pooler held that Bitcoin
did not fall under the statutory definitions of “payment
instrument” or “monetary instrument” because virtual currency
is not directly specified nor could it be included within one of the
defined categories listed in Fla. Stat. § 560.103(29) or
896.101(2). Furthermore, Judge Pooler, alluding to the doctrine
of lenity, refused to hold Espinoza responsible under a statute that
is “so vaguely written that even legal professionals have difficulty
finding a singular meaning.”1
Judge Pooler thus disagreed with earlier decisions by several
federal judges. The federal courts have uniformly held that Bitcoin
is “money” or “funds” for the purpose of money laundering.
Additionally, the federal courts, analyzing the applicable federal
money laundering statutes, have refused to apply the doctrine of
lenity because there were no ambiguities such that “an ordinary
person would [not] know that engaging in the challenged conduct
could give rise to the type of criminal liability charged.”2 State
and federal courts can interpret similar state and federal statutes
in differing ways based on each statute’s respective canon of
construction and legislative intent. However, because the Florida
*

Brandon Peck is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of Miami School of Law,
member of the University of Miami Business Law Review and graduate of Carnegie
Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
1
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
2
See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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Money Laundering Act (Fla. Stat. § 896.101) is modeled on the
federal Money Laundering Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 1956), it is
reasonable to assume that the courts would reach the same
conclusion.
Part I of this comment describes Bitcoin, discussing the
cryptocurrency’s origins as well as how it works. Part II analyzes
both the state and federal anti–money laundering statutes in light
of Florida v. Espinoza and the opinions of the federal courts. Part
III discusses the state and federal business services statutes in
light of Florida v. Espinoza and federal court decisions, including
U.S. v. Ulbricht, which held Bitcoin to be within the plain meaning
of “money” and “funds” under the applicable federal money
laundering statute.
Finally, Part IV of this paper addresses the public policy
implications of how Bitcoin is interpreted under criminal statutes
pertaining to money laundering. A brief synopsis will provide
information on how other countries and states have considered
Bitcoin and the steps that the U.S. Congress has begun to take to
address Bitcoin in criminal prosecutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Nobody knows what a dollar is, what the word means, what holds
the thing up, [and] what it stands in for.”3
A decision from the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida has
disagreed with several federal court decisions regarding whether Bitcoin,
and cryptocurrencies more generally, are “money” or “property.”4 The
distinction has implications on whether Bitcoin, as well as other
cryptocurrencies, is subject to current federal and state anti–money
laundering and unlawful money services business statutes. If Bitcoin is
considered “money,” and, therefore subject to current money laundering
statutes, persons using Bitcoin while engaged in the acts of money
laundering may be prosecuted pursuant to current state and federal
statutes. However, if Bitcoin is considered “property,” persons using
Bitcoin to launder money have not violated the applicable federal or state
money laundering statutes according to the applicable statutory language.
Proponents of characterizing Bitcoin as “money” argue that the
cryptocurrency functions like money and, therefore, it should be treated
like money. At times, Bitcoin is used to (1) purchase goods and services,
(2) measure value, and (3) exchange for conventional legal tender or
currencies.5 However, advocates who argue for Bitcoin to be considered
property cite the cryptocurrency’s (1) decentralization, (2) volatility and
instability in future value, and (3) acceptance only by a narrow selection
of merchants.6
3
Toby Lester, The Money Artist, THE ATLANTIC (July 1999), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/07/the-money-artist/308425/.
4
Compare Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016), with United States v.
Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), and Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6,
2013).
5
See generally Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 707; Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545; Ulbricht,
31 F. Supp. 3d at 548, 570; Shavers, WL 4028182, at *2.
6
See Michelle Singletary, Investing in Bitcoin has a Dangerous Flip Side, WASH. POST
(Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/investing-in-bitcoin-has-adangerous-flip-side/2014/02/28/09af7f54-9e5e-11e3-9ba6-800d1192d08b_story.html?
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Money Laundering in the United States
“Money laundering is the process of making illegally gained proceeds
(i.e. ‘dirty money’) appear legal (i.e. ‘clean money’)” and is usually
conducted in three stages: “placement, layering, and integration.”7
“Placement” occurs when illegally gained proceeds are invested or
“introduced into a legitimate financial system or business.”8 The illegally
gained proceeds are then “layered” or mixed with legitimate money, which
creates confusion regarding the whereabouts or origins of the illegally
gained proceeds.9 Finally, “integration” refers to the illegally–gained
proceeds becoming sufficiently intertwined with legitimate money such
that it is safe to be withdrawn from the financial system and used for other
purposes without being identified as illegitimate.10 Although there is
evidence that the act of hiding money or assets from state confiscation has
been ongoing for several thousand years,11 money laundering in the United
States has been addressed as a response to the Prohibition in the 1930s,
organized crime in the 1970s, and drug wars of the 1980s.12
Congress has enacted modern anti–money laundering statutes
throughout the course of the last century, primarily aiming to combat
organized crime and drug trafficking. In 1970, Congress passed the Bank
Secrecy Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(the “RICO Act”).13 The Bank Secrecy Act has become one of the most
important tools in combatting money laundering as it “[e]stablished
requirements for recordkeeping and reporting by [both] . . . individuals . . .
and financial institutions” in order to aid in the identification of the

utm_term=.3e608f904f76. In regards to volatility, the value of a bitcoin was “less than $14
[fourteen dollars] in January 2013 and jumped to $1,200 [one thousand two hundred
dollars] in November of 2013.” Id.
7
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, History of Anti–Money Laundering Laws,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, https://www.fincen.gov/history-antimoney-laundering-laws (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
8
Id.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
See Nigel Morris–Cotterill, A Brief History of Money Laundering, MONEY
LAUNDERING RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE, http://www.countermoneylaundering.
com/public/content/brief-history-money-laundering (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
12
See Roberto Saviano, Where the Mob Keeps its Money, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/where-the-mob-keeps-its-money.
html.
13
See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 7; Eliot Kaough, Methods
Used to Combat Organized Crime and Racketeering: United States, United Kingdom, Italy
and Canada, INFORMATION & KNOWLEDGE SERVICES, http://archive.mops.gov.il/
Documents/International_Public_Security_Briefs/Organized%20crime%20brief%2001.1
3.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
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“source, volume, and movement of currency.”14 The Act legally bound
banks “to (1) report cash transaction over $10,000 [ten thousand dollars],
(2) properly identify persons conducting [these] transactions, and (3)
maintain a paper trail by keeping appropriate records . . . .”15 The RICO
Act was primarily focused on prosecuting Mafia syndicates, but was
expanded by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act in 1984 to address
money laundering more appropriately.16 In 1986, Congress passed the
Money Laundering Control Act, which officially designated money
laundering as a federal crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (the “Federal
Anti–Money Laundering Statute”).17

The Origins of Bitcoin and Blockchain
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency and peer–to–peer payment system that was
launched on January 3, 2009.18 Although Bitcoin was not the first
cryptocurrency ever introduced19 and there indeed exists hundreds of other
such electronic payment systems,20 Bitcoin is the world’s first completely
decentralized digital currency that enabled transactions to occur between
users directly without the intervention or regulation of any financial
intermediaries, such as banks or credit card companies.21 The purpose of
Bitcoin is to provide “a solution to the double–spending problem” and
“achieve a level of privacy” within peer–to–peer online transactions
without the need and additional costs of a trusted third party.22
14

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 7.
Id.
16
Kaough, supra note 13.
17
See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 7.
18
See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer–to–Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN
(Oct. 31, 2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf; L.S., Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?,
ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/
11/economist-explains-1. An anonymous programmer, or group of programmers, who used
the alias of “Satoshi Nakamoto,” invented and developed Bitcoin.
19
See Derek Khanna, Can Bitcoin Outrun the Regulators?, POLITIX (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.rstreet.org/op-ed/can-bitcoin-outrun-the-regulators/. E–Gold and Liberty
Dollar, other digital currencies, have essentially been shut down by the government. E–
Gold was backed by gold while Liberty Dollar was backed by silver. E–Gold was shut
down following money laundering charges and Bernard Von Nothause, the creator of
Liberty Dollar, was convicted in 2011 of making and possessing currency.
20
See CryptoCurrency Market Capitalizations, COIN MKT. CAP, http://coinmarketcap.
com/all/views/all/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). As of March 19, 2017, one Bitcoin had a
value of $1,069.91 USD.
21
See Nakamoto, supra note 18; Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for
Policymakers, GEORGE MASON UNIV. MARCATUS CTR. (2013), at 1, https://www.mercatus.
org/system/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer.pdf.
22
Nakamoto, supra note 18, at 1–6. The “double–spending” problem is that the bitcoin
payees cannot verify that the payor did not already spend the bitcoin in a previous
transaction. A solution to this problem that Bitcoin was intended to forego is the
15
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Bitcoin exists freely on the internet and is available for anyone to use
across the globe.23 Bitcoin does not require personal user information, such
as a credit card or bank account identification number, because Bitcoin
transactions are conducted without the use of any government–supported
fiat currency.24 Rather, Bitcoin transactions are conducted using a unit
known as a “bitcoin.”25 Unlike traditional currency, bitcoin has no physical
form and exists only electronically on the internet. However, like
government–supported fiat currency, bitcoin is backed by individuals’
faith in the currency. Therefore, if users lose faith in Bitcoin, demand for
bitcoins will decrease and bitcoins will no longer have value.26
Instead of government or central authorities producing and
introducing bitcoins into the marketplace, the only way that bitcoins are
created is through a process known as “mining.”27 Conducted by
individual Bitcoin–user computers and processors throughout the world,
mining is the process of verifying, recording, and publishing recent
Bitcoin transactions to a shared public distribution ledger called the
“blockchain.”28 All Bitcoin transactions are published and made public on
the blockchain ledger.29 New bitcoins are created and awarded to
successful miners as a form of compensation for the use of the miner’s
computer processing unit and the electricity expended during the process

“introduc[tion] of a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for
double spending.”
23
See Jason Leibowitz, Bitcoin: A 21st Century Currency Explained by a Wall Street
Veteran, COINDESK (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-explained-globalcurrency-wall-street-veteran/.
24
See id.
25
See Brito & Castillo, supra note 21. A unit of bitcoin is also referred to as a BTC;
however, for simplicity purposes, I will use Bitcoin (capitalized) to refer to the
cryptocurrency payment system itself, bitcoin (lowercased) as the unit of a transaction, and
cryptocurrencies generally as all of the existing digital currencies.
26
See Allison Caffarone & Meg Holzer, ‘Ev’ry American Experiment Sets a Precedent’:
Why One Florida State Court’s Bitcoin Opinion is Everyone’s Business, 16 HOFSTRA L. J.
OF INT’L BUS. & L. 6, 8 (2017) (pointing out that Bitcoins are a consumer faith–based
system).
27
See id.
28
See Joshua Kopstein, The Mission to Decentralize the Internet, NEW YORKER (Dec.
12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-mission-to-decentralize-theinternet. Bitcoin software users utilize their individual computer processors to check the
validity of transactions, add such transactions to their individual copy of blockchain, and
broadcast the additional transactions to other nodes all in order to ensure that no one uses
the same bitcoins twice. Approximately six times per hour, a new group of accepted
transactions, known as a “block,” is created, added to the blockchain, published to all other
nodes, which are maintaining their own copies of the blockchain.
29
See Caffarone & Holzer, supra note 26, at 8.
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of recording and publishing Bitcoin transactions.30 Therefore, Bitcoin
users who are engaged in the process of mining authenticate Bitcoin
transactions and thus forego the need of any third–party institution or
regulatory body to verify the individual transactions.31
In order to spend his or her bitcoins, a user must first digitally sign the
transaction by inputting a corresponding private key, which only the owner
of the bitcoins is designed to know.32 Bitcoin maintains the privacy of
transaction’s parties by limiting the information published to the
blockchain ledger and keeping the public key ownership anonymous.33
Similar to a public stock exchange, third–party Bitcoin users are aware
that a Bitcoin user is sending bitcoins to another user, but only information
regarding the time and amount of the transaction is published and made
public.34 The identities of the payor and payee of a Bitcoin transaction are
not made public on the blockchain ledger.35 Currently, about twelve
million (12,000,000) bitcoins are in circulation.36
Bitcoins can also be obtained through the exchange of other
currencies, including the government–supported United States Dollar,
Euro, and Chinese Yen, as well as other digital currencies; additionally,
bitcoins may be procured through the sale of products and services.37
These exchanges can be completed directly by purchasing the bitcoins
from a bitcoin dealer or indirectly through a “bitcoin exchange,” which
allows prospective Bitcoin buyers to purchase the bitcoins using
traditional currency.38 More than one hundred thousand (100,000)
merchants, including Microsoft and Paypal, now accept bitcoins as forms
30

See Nakamoto, supra note 18 at 4; Kopstein, supra note 27. Miners keep the
blockchain consistent, complete, and effectively unalterable by repeatedly verifying and
collecting newly broadcast transactions into every new group of transactions called a block.
Bitcoin was designed such that only twenty–one million (21,000,000) can be issued or
“mined.” Until 2020, twelve and one half (12.5) bitcoins will be produced per block
(approximately every ten minutes) and used as compensation to miners. Thereafter, the
number of bitcoins will halve every 210,000 blocks (approximately every four years) until
the limit is reached.
31
See Caffarone & Holzer, supra note 26, at 8–9.
32
Brito & Castillo, supra note 21, at 5. If the private key is lost, the Bitcoin network
will not recognize or honor any other evidence of ownership; thus, rendering the bitcoins
unusable and effectively lost. See also Man Throws Away 7,500 Bitcoins, Now Worth $7.5
Million, CBS DC, http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/11/29/man-throws-away-7500bitcoins-now-worth-7-5-million/. For a bitcoin transaction to be valid, every bitcoin input
must be (1) an unspent output of a previous transaction and (2) digitally signed.
33
See Nakamoto, supra note 18, at 6.
34
Id.
35
See Caffarone & Holzer, supra note 26, at 9.
36
See Khanna, supra note 19, at 1.
37
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182 at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
38
Caffarone & Holzer, supra note 26, at 34, 37.

198

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:191

of payment.39 Although Bitcoin has been acknowledged in some online
markets and retail spaces, it has received scrutiny and negative attention
from legislative bodies, regulatory agencies, law enforcement, and the
media due to its use by criminals.40
The two most infamous incidents surrounding Bitcoin both occurred
in 2013. The first involved Mt. Gox, a bitcoin exchange launched in 2010
that at one time handled approximately seventy percent (70%) of all
bitcoin transactions.41 Mt. Gox suspended trading, closed its website, and
filed for bankruptcy before announcing that seven hundred and fifty
thousand (750,000) bitcoins belonging to customers had gone missing and
were likely stolen.42 The second incident involved an online black market
platform, known as the “Silk Road,” which provided illegal drugs, child
pornography, murder–for–hire services, and weapons for those that
exchanged in bitcoins.43 The Silk Road was shut down by U.S. law
enforcement and the founder of the online market, Ross William Ulbricht,
was sentenced to life in prison.44

39

See Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Now Accepted by 100,000 Merchants Worldwide,
INT’L BUS. TIMES, (Feb. 4, 2015, 3:34 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-nowaccepted-by-100000-merchants-worldwide-1486613.
40
See Timothy B. Lee & Hayley Tsukayama, Bitcoin Industry Reeling as Authorities
Shut Down Silk Road Online Marketplace, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bitcoin-industry-reeling-as-authorities-shut-down
-silk-road-online-marketplace/2013/10/02/961b105a-2ba1-11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_
story.html?utm_term=.e21eff6ec1b6; Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How Bitcoin Charmed
Washington, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2013/11/21/heres-how-bitcoin-charmed-washington/?utm_term=.4751fd061
18e.
41
See Paul Vigna, Five Things About Mt. Gox’s Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/02/25/5-things-about-mt-goxs-crisis.
42
See Carter Dougherty & Grace Huang, Mt. Gox Seeks Bankruptcy After $480 Million
Bitcoin Loss, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:59 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-02-28/mt-gox-exchange-files-for-bankruptcy. The loss in Bitcoins
were valued at more than four hundred and fifty million dollars ($450 million) at the time.
43
See Nicolas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large
Anonymous Online Marketplace, INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, at 8,
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/nicolasc/publications/Christin-WWW13.pdf.
It
is
estimated that the Silk Road hosted between five (5) and nine (9) percent of all transactions
on all exchanges in the world; almost all of which involving drugs. Buyers and sellers who
utilized the Silk Road were required to conduct all transactions with bitcoins in order to
provide a certain level of anonymity.
44
See Judgment in a Criminal Case at 3, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14–cr–00068–
KBF–1 (2014), https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/New_York_Southern_District_Court
/1--14-cr-00068/USA_v._Ulbricht/269/.
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Bitcoin Precedence In Florida
“Buying Bitcoins allows money to be anonymously moved around
the world with a click of a computer mouse. Improperly used, Bitcoins
are often seen as a perfect means of laundering dirty money or for
buying and selling illegal goods, such as drugs or stolen credit card
information.”45
Until 2016, only federal courts had provided precedent regarding the
analysis and scrutiny of Bitcoin under money laundering statutes.46
However, following the arrest of two Miami residents, Pascal Reid and
Michel Abner Espinoza, Florida has become the first state to prosecute
Bitcoin users pursuant to state statutes.47 Law enforcement officers
discovered that Reid and Espinoza were using a Bitcoin exchange known
as “LocalBitcoins.”48 In separate sting operations seeking “individuals
engaged in high volume Bitcoin activity,” undercover officers informed
Reid and Espinoza that the officers were using Bitcoin to purchase stolen
credit card numbers.49 Reid sold to members of the United States Secret
Service’s Miami Electronic Crimes Task Force (“Task Force”), a unit
comprised of state and local agents, twenty–six thousand five hundred
dollars ($26,500) worth of bitcoins and was charged in violation of state
money laundering and unlicensed money service business statutes.50 Reid
accepted a plea agreement on September 16, 2015, and has been sentenced
to serve five (5) years of probation.51

45

Susannah Nesmith, Miami Bitcoin Arrests may be First State Prosecution,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2014, 1:27 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201402-09/miami-bitcoin-arrests-may-be-first-state-prosecution.
46
See United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v.
Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
47
See Nesmith, supra note 45 at 1. The Miami–Dade County State Attorney announced,
“The use of Bitcoins . . . is a new technological flourish to this very old crime [of money
laundering and these] arrests may be the first state prosecutions involving the use of
[b]itcoins in money laundering operations.”
48
See id.
49
Id.
50
See Id.; Jerin Mathew, Pascal Reid and Michell Abner Espinoza Bitcoin Trial: ‘Money
Laundering Using Bitcoin Not Crime, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014, 8:13 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/pascal-reid-michell-abner-espinoza-bitcoin-trial-moneylaundering-using-bitcoin-not-crime-1438268.
51
See Harvey Ruvin Clerk of the Courts for Miami–Dade County, Miami–Dade County
Criminal Justice Online System, https://www2.miami-dadeclerk.com/cjis/CaseSearch.
aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
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State of Florida v. Michel Abner Espinoza
On December 4, 2013, Detective Ricardo Arias, a member of the
Miami Beach Police Department, and Special Agent Gregory Ponzi of the
United States Secret Service accessed a peer–to–peer Bitcoin exchange
website seeking to purchase Bitcoin.52 Arias and Ponzi contacted
Espinoza, a user identified by the username on the website as
“Michelhack,” who represented himself as a seller and dictated that
interested buyers would have to pay for the bitcoins in cash and in
person.53 Acting in an undercover capacity and contacting Espinoza
through text message correspondences with Espinoza’s listed phone
number, Arias arranged a meeting with Espinoza.54
On December 5, 2013, as a result of this meeting, Espinoza agreed to
sell 0.4032258 bitcoins to Arias in exchange for five hundred dollars
($500) in cash.55 However, during this meeting, there was no discussion
of illegal activity or stolen credit cards as Arias’ fabricated purpose for
these recently purchase bitcoins.56 On January 10, 2014, Arias arranged a
second meeting with Espinoza for the purchase of one (1) bitcoin in
exchange for one thousand dollars ($1,000).57 At this meeting, Arias
informed Espinoza that he was in the business of buying stolen credit card
numbers and that the bitcoins would be used to pay for such information.58
On January 30, 2014, Arias arranged with Espinoza a third Bitcoin

52

See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016). “LocalBitcoins.com”
is a website that allowed users who wished to sell Bitcoin to create an online advertisement
conveying the amount of Bitcoin that the user was offering and the asking price. Then,
potential buyers could browse the website’s advertisements and may arrange to purchase
Bitcoin, either electronically online or in–person, with any seller who had posted.
53
See id. at 2. Arias and Ponzi elected Espinoza for the newly established investigation
not because of any previous reports that Espinoza was engaged in any illicit criminal
activity, but rather because his username, availability, and his desire to meet in public
places.
54
See id.
55
See id. During this meeting on December 5, 2013, Espinoza explained to Arias how
he had made a profit of eighty–three dollars and sixty–seven cents ($83.67) from this
Bitcoin transaction: by purchasing the Bitcoin at ten percent (10%) under market value and
selling it at a five percent (5%) above market value.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
See id. Arias also asked if Espinoza would be willing to accept any stolen credit card
numbers as a trade for Bitcoin in their next transaction; Espinoza allegedly replied that he
would consider such a form of payment. However, there was no evidence that Espinoza
actually accepted stolen credit card numbers as payment for any subsequent Bitcoin
transaction with Arias.
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transaction for five hundred dollars ($500) worth of Bitcoin, which was
completed in its entirety through text message communication.59
On February 6, 2014, Arias and Espinoza met for a fourth Bitcoin
transaction; this time, Arias sought to purchase the equivalent of thirty
thousand dollars ($30,000) in Bitcoin.60 During this meeting, Arias further
explained that his illicit credit card operation, which Arias had fabricated
as part of his undercover investigation, worked by purchasing the stolen
credit cards wholesale with Bitcoin and then reselling the information at a
marked–up price.61 Arias presented Espinoza with thirty thousand dollars
($30,000) in cash, which were actually undercover funds that were
counterfeit.62 Espinoza never took possession of the counterfeit money,
but was subsequently arrested.63
The State of Florida charged Espinoza with one count of operating and
engaging in an unlawful money services business in violation of Fla. Stat.
§ 560.125(5)(a) (the “Florida Business Services Statute”) and two counts
of money laundering in violation of § 896.101(3)(c) (the “Florida Anti–
Money Laundering Statute”).64 On July 22, 2016, Eleventh Judicial Circuit
Court Judge for Miami–Dade County, Teresa Pooler, granted Espinoza’s
Motion to Dismiss as to all three counts.65 On August 10, 2016, Assistant
State Attorney, Thomas Haggerty, of the State Attorney’s Office filed an
appeal to Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal.66 At the time of this
comment’s publication, a date for the appellate hearings had not yet been
scheduled.67

II. THE MONEY LAUNDERING CHARGES
In Espinoza, Circuit Court Judge Pooler incorrectly dismissed both
money laundering counts because of a failure to consider whether Bitcoin
constitutes “funds” under the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute as
well as the improper applications of the lenity and void–for–vagueness
doctrines. The Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute provides that
59

See id. at 2–3.
See id. at 3.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id. Espinoza, fearing that the cash was counterfeit, desired to bring portions of the
money to the bank “a little at a time” in order to verify its authenticity.
64
See id.
65
See id. at 8.
66
Florida Third District Court of Appeal Docket, State v. Espinoza, No. 3D16–1860,
http://jweb.flcourts.org/pls/ds/ds_docket (last visited Aug. 18, 2017). Court records from
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Miami–Dade County were received by the
Third District Court of Appeal on January 6, 2017.
67
See id.
60
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it is unlawful for a person to conduct or attempt to conduct
a financial transaction which involves property or
proceeds which an investigative or law enforcement
officer . . . represents as being derived from, or as being
used to conduct or facilitate, specified unlawful activity,
when the person’s conduct or attempted conduct is
undertaken with the intent: (1) to promote the carrying on
of specified unlawful activity or (2) to conceal or disguise
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds or property believed to be the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . .68
Thus, the critical question for the Espinoza court to consider became
whether Espinoza’s Bitcoin transaction with Arias fell under the statutory
definition of “financial transaction.”
The Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute defines “financial
transaction” as “a transaction involving the movement of funds by wire or
other means or involving one or more monetary instruments, which in any
way or degree affects commerce . . . .”69 By this statutory definition, the
Espinoza court should have concluded that Espinoza’s Bitcoin transaction
with Arias did qualify as a financial transaction and, therefore, fell within
the purview of the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute if bitcoins
constitute (1) “funds” or (2) “monetary instruments.” Although the term
“funds” is not defined, the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute
defines “monetary instruments” as “coin or currency of the United States
or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks,
money orders, investment securities in bearer form . . . and negotiable
instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto
passes upon delivery.”70 Virtual or digital currencies are not specifically
defined or included in either definition.71

Bitcoins Constitute “Funds” under Applicable Anti–Money
Laundering Statutes
Although it is proper that bitcoins do not fall under the Florida Anti–
Money Laundering Statute’s definition of “monetary instruments,”
Bitcoin transactions still qualify as “financial transactions” because
bitcoins constitute “funds.” As previously mentioned, a financial
68

FLA. STAT. § 896.101(3)(c) (2016) (emphasis added).
FLA. STAT. § 896.101(2)(d) (2016) (emphasis added).
70
FLA. STAT. § 896.101(2)(e) (2016).
71
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
69
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transaction is any “transaction involving the movement of funds by wire
or other means or involving one or more monetary instruments, which in
any way or degree affects commerce.”72 This is a mutually exclusive
definition that sets forth two prongs. The first prong defines a “financial
transaction” as any transaction involving the movement of funds by wire
or other means, which in any way or degree affects commerce. The second
prong defines “financial transaction” as any transaction involving one or
more monetary instruments, which in any way or degree affects
commerce.
Because Espinoza is the first case to consider Bitcoin under the Florida
Anti–Money Laundering Statute, there is no precedent as to whether
bitcoins constitute “funds” under the Florida Anti–Money Laundering
Statute itself. However, unlike in Florida, there is substantial precedent in
the Federal court system as it pertains to digital currencies, particularly
Bitcoin, and their statuses within various federal statutes.73 This is
noteworthy because the provisions of the Florida Anti–Money Laundering
Statute virtually mirror the elements of its federal counterpart, the Federal
Anti–Money Laundering Statute. Accordingly, because the Florida and the
Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statutes are substantively identical, the
Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute’s definition of “financial
transaction” also includes “funds” and “monetary instruments.”74 Also
72

§ 896.101(2)(d) (emphasis added).
See United States v. Murgio, No. 15–cr–769, 2016 LEXIS 131745 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);
United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v.
Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No.
4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013); Tanaya Macheel, Four Court
Cases Helping Shape the U.S. Stance on Bitcoin, COINDESK (Sept. 28, 2014, 2:09 PM),
http://www.coindesk.com/4-court-cases-helping-determine-us-stance-bitcoin/; Shavers,
2013 WL 4028182 at *1. Trendon Shavers, the founder and operator of Bitcoin Savings
and Trust, was fined forty million dollars ($40,000,000) by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) for allegedly defrauding investors of a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme by
making a number of misrepresentations to investors regarding the nature of the
investments. The case against Shavers was brought before Magistrate Judge Amos L.
Mazzant of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to
alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934. In his
Memorandum Opinion Regarding the Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Magistrate
Judge Mazzant held that it was clear that Bitcoin could be used as “money” because it
could be used to purchase goods or services, pay for individual living expenses, and be
exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, Euro, and Yen. Magistrate
Judge Mazzant noted that “the only limitation of Bitcoin is that it is limited to those places
that accept it as currency.” Magistrate Judge Mazzant concluded that “Bitcoin is a currency
or form of money, and investors wishing to invest in [Bitcoin Savings and Trust] provided
an investment of money.”
74
Laundering of Monetary Instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)–(2) (1988). The Federal
Anti–Money Laundering Statute states that “[w]hoever, knowing that the property
involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful
73
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important is the fact that the term “funds” in both the Florida and Federal
Anti–Money Laundering Statutes is undefined; requiring courts to
interpret the term in light of its plain meaning.
Particularly, “in construing a federal statute, a Florida court will look
to related decisions of the federal courts in an attempt to construe it in a
manner that will best effectuate its purpose.”75 The Florida legislature’s
intent to develop a “strategic state–based anti–money laundering initiative
is clear from the tailored nature of the [Florida] statutes quilted together
by federal statutory stitching.”76 Although Espinoza was prosecuted under
Florida statutes, these statutes were modeled after the federal money
laundering statutes; therefore, the Espinoza court should have at least
considered how federal courts addressed Bitcoin under the Federal Anti–
Money Laundering Statute for guidance.77 Because the Florida legislature,
like the U.S. Congress, did not provide a statutory definition of “funds”
within the pertinent money laundering statute, the Espinoza court should
have, and indeed did, however incorrectly, construe “funds” in its ordinary
sense by ascertaining the plain or ordinary meaning of “funds” by
reference to a dictionary.78
By conducting such plain and ordinary meaning analyses, several
notable federal cases have concluded that bitcoins qualify as “funds,” and
therefore Bitcoin transactions are “financial transactions,” pursuant to the

activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves
the proceeds . . . (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or . . . (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part (i) to conceal
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds
of specified unlawful activity . . . shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than [five hundred
thousand dollars] $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction,
whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.”; 18 U.S.C.
§1956(c)(4) (1988). The statute defines “financial transaction” as “(A) a transaction which
in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of
funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments . . . .” The
statute further defines “monetary instruments” as “(i) coin or currency of the United States
or of any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders,
or (ii) investment securities or negotiable instruments . . . .”
75
48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 108 (2014).
76
Israel Reyes, Florida’s Anti–Money Laundering Statutes, FLA. BAR J. (July/Aug.
1999), https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/FA4AF4C5C0F457
DE85256ADB005D6287 (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
77
See 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 124 (2014). When the legislature has not given a term
a statutory definition, the courts should construe a term in such a manner that would be in
accordance with the literal meaning of the term as well as give effect to both the objective
and the purpose of the statute.
78
48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 126 (2014). “Where the legislature has not defined the
words used in a statute, the language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”
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Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute. In United States v. Faiella,79
United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, Jed S.
Rakoff, held that Bitcoin “qualified as [both] ‘money’ or ‘funds’ under the
plain meaning definitions of those terms because Bitcoin could be easily
purchased in exchange for ordinary currency, acted as a denominator of
value, and was used to conduct financial transactions.”80 In acknowledging
that the Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute refers to “funds” rather
than “money,” the Faiella court reasoned that Bitcoin fit the plain
language meaning of “funds” according to the Merriam–Webster
Dictionary, which is “‘available money’ or ‘an amount of something that
is available for use: a supply of something.’” Similarly, in United States v.
Ulbricht,81 United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of
79

United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); See Tanaya
Macheel, Four Court Cases Helping Shape the U.S. Stance on Bitcoin, COINDESK (Sept.
28, 2014, 2:09 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/4-court-cases-helping-determine-usstance-bitcoin/. Amongst others, Robert Faiella was charged with two (2) counts of
operating an unlicensed money transmitting business pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and one
(1) count of money laundering conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) in connection
with his alleged participation with the underground market website, the “Silk Road,” and
the use of Bitcoin.
80
Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545. For support of his opinion, District Judge Rakoff
looked to the ordinary meaning of “money” as defined by the Merriam–Webster
Dictionary, which defined the term as “something generally accepted as a medium of
exchange, a measure of value, or a means of payment.” Additionally, District Judge Rakoff
held that Faiella “qualified as a ‘money transmitter’ for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1960
because virtual currency exchangers constitute[s] ‘money transmitters.’”
81
See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Amongst
three other counts including narcotics trafficking and computer hacking conspiracies, Ross
Ulbricht was charged with money laundering conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956 by
designing, launching, and administering the online marketplace website for the sale of
illicit goods and services, known as the “Silk Road.” More specifically, the government
alleged that Ulbricht conspired with individuals by engaging in thousands of unlawful
transactions that occurred on the site over the course of three (3) years following its launch.
These unlawful transactions were said to include the buying and selling of illegal narcotics
and malicious computer software as well as opportunity to laundering the proceeds of such
sales using Bitcoin. The Silk Road operated much like eBay in that “a seller would
electronically post a good or service for sale; a buyer would electronically purchase the
item; the seller would then ship or otherwise provide to the buyer the purchased item; the
buyer would provide feedback; and the site operator would receive a portion of the seller’s
revenue as a commission.” However, unlike eBay, the Silk Road was only available to
users that utilized “Tor, a [computer] software and network that allows for anonymous,
untraceable Internet browsing.” Also unlike eBay, the only form of payment permitted
between buyers and sellers on the Silk Road was Bitcoin. This allowed the buyers and
sellers, as well as Ulbricht, to engaged in transactions anonymously on the Silk Road while
being anywhere in the world with an Internet connection. The only points of contact with
the buyers and sellers were a username, which was often fake, and the address to where the
items would be sent or the services rendered. When it began in 2011, the Silk road served
primarily drug users who sought marijuana, Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD), Ecstasy,
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New York, Katherine B. Forrest, addressed Ulbricht’s argument that
bitcoins are not money because virtual currencies have some, but not all
of the attributes of currency such as legal tender status, and, therefore,
transactions involving Bitcoin cannot be prosecutable under current
money laundering statutes.82 The Ulbricht court stated that it is clear from
the plain meaning of the statutory language that “financial transaction”
captures the movement of “funds” by any means.83 Like money, “funds”
are objects used either to pay for things directly or as a medium of
exchange.84 The Ulbricht court reasoned that “[b]itcoins carry value—that
is their purpose and function—and act as a medium of exchange.”85 The
Ulbricht court held that the Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute is
sufficiently broad to consider Bitcoin in financial transactions and that one
can launder money using Bitcoin as a medium.86
Because there was no Florida case law precedent available to guide
the Espinoza court in determining whether bitcoins are “funds” under the
Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute, it seems logical that the Espinoza
court should have looked to the how the federal courts have dealt with the
issue in regard to the substantively identical Federal Anti–Money
Laundering Statute. However, the Espinoza court ignored the question of
whether bitcoins qualified as “funds.” Rather, the Espinoza court
and prescription medication from sellers across the world. As the website grew in
popularity, it began to host sellers who offered other illicit products and services, including
forged documents and fake driver’s licenses. By the time the Silk Road was shut down,
“the site had sales revenue of more than 9.5 million bitcoins, valued at about 1.2 billion
dollars [($1,200,000,000)].” As mentioned, Ulbricht was arrested in San Francisco,
California, on October 2, 2013 and was charged with one (1) count of participation in a
narcotics trafficking conspiracy, one (1) count of continuing a criminal enterprise, one (1)
count of computer hacking conspiracy, and one (1) count of money laundering conspiracy.
Ulbricht’s case was brought before a United States District Court Judge for the Southern
District of New York, Katherine B. Forrest, and the trial began on January 13, 2015.
Ulbricht was convicted by a jury on February 4, 2015, and sentenced to life in prison on
May 29, 2015. See Joseph Goldstein, Arrest in U.S. Shuts Down a Black Market for
Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/nyregion/
operator-of-online-market-for-illegal-drugs-is-charged-fbi-says.html. Ulbricht, who was
known by the username “Dread Pirate Roberts,” was arrested in San Francisco, California,
on October 2, 2013. The government estimates that Ulbricht collected sales commissions
of more than six hundred thousand (600,000) bitcoins, the equivalent of eighty million
dollars ($80,000,000).
82
See Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 569.
83
See id. at 570.
84
See id.
85
See id. at 548, 570. (“[T]he only value for Bitcoin lies in its ability to pay for things –
it is digital and has no earthly form; it cannot be put on a shelf and looked at or collected
in a nice display case.”)
86
See id. at 571. “Congress intended to prevent criminals from finding ways to wash
proceeds of criminal activity by transferring proceeds to other similar . . . . items that store
significant value.”
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overlooked “funds” when considering the statutory definition of “financial
transaction” and relied upon its earlier analysis of “payment instrument”
under the Florida Business Services Statute as a surrogate for the statutory
definition of “monetary instrument.”87 However, the term “funds” is not
included within the Florida Business Services Statute’s definition of
“payment instrument” and is only within the Florida Anti–Money
Laundering Statute’s first prong of “financial transaction.”88 It is likely
that if the Espinoza court considered whether bitcoins were “funds,” the
court would have reached a concurring conclusion with those of the federal
courts.
“Funds” are “a sum of money or other resources . . . set apart for a
specific objective” or “available pecuniary resources”89 and “money” is
“something generally accepted as a medium of exchange, a measure of
value, or a means of payment.”90 The primary purpose and function of
bitcoins, unlike cigarettes or other goods, is to act as a medium of
exchange and means of payment. Without these exchange or payment
functions, Bitcoin serves no other practical purpose to users.

The Espinoza Court Incorrectly Analyzed “Monetary Instruments”
Although the Espinoza court’s conclusion that bitcoins are not
“monetary instruments” is correct, the court reached the conclusion
through flawed reasoning and careless oversight of elements comprising
the statutory definition of “financial transaction.” The Espinoza court’s
analysis of Espinoza’s actions under the Florida Anti–Money Laundering
Statute and conclusion that Bitcoin transactions were not “financial
transactions” are incorrect because the court improperly relied upon its
conclusion that bitcoins do not qualify as “payment instruments” within
the Florida Business Services Statute to conclude that Bitcoin could not
constitute a “monetary instrument” under the Florida Anti–Money
Laundering Statute. The Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute defines
“monetary instruments” as
coin or currency of the United States or of any other
country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks,
87

See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 6–7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016); United States v.
Murgio, No. 15–cr–769, 2016 LEXIS 131745 at *28 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
88
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 3–6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
89
Pecuniary, MERRIAM–WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
pecuniary (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) (meaning “consisting of or measured in money.”).
90
Money, MERRIAM–WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/money
(last visited Aug. 26, 2017).
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money orders, investment securities in bearer form . . .
and negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in
such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.91
While none of these enumerated items sufficiently qualifies bitcoins
as “monetary instruments,” the Espinoza court immediately forewent any
analysis of whether bitcoins are “monetary instruments” and concluded,
that because bitcoins are not “payment instruments” under the Florida
Business Services Statute, bitcoins are cannot be “monetary instruments”
under the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute.92 Further, the Espinoza
court reasoned that “if the statute is read to mean that in the transaction,
[Espinoza] must be the party who uses the monetary instruments, then the
money laundering statute would not apply . . . because Bitcoins, as
previously discussed, are not monetary instruments.”93 However, the
Espinoza court reasoned that the “more likely interpretation of the
[applicable money laundering] statute is that as long as one party of the
transaction [(Espinoza or Arias)] . . . is using a monetary instrument, a
financial transaction has occurred.”94 This reasoning is deeply flawed and
misleading to opinion readers. Not only does it ignore the first prong of
“financial transaction” referring to “funds,” but it also implies that
“payment instruments” within the Florida Business Services Statute and
“monetary instruments” within the Florida Anti–Money Statute are
defined identically and are comprised of the same items. This is not the
case as a “payment instrument” is “a check, draft, warrant, money order,
traveler’s check, electronic instrument, or other instrument, payment of
money, or monetary value whether or not negotiable.”95
While “payment instruments” of the Florida Business Services Statute
and “monetary instruments” of the Florida Anti–Money Laundering
Statute include overlapping items such as checks, money orders, and
negotiable instruments, the statutory definitions have a few notable
differences. The term “payment instruments” also includes electronic
instruments and the payment of money while the term “monetary
instruments” includes coin or currency of the United States or of any
country. Arguably, “payment instruments” is defined more broadly and,
therefore, renders analyzing “monetary instrument” unnecessary after
concluding that bitcoins are not “payment instruments” because bitcoins
are not “money” pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute.
91

FLA. STAT. § 896.101(2)(e) (2016).
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 6–7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 4.
95
FLA STAT. § 560.103(29) (2016).
92
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However, the Espinoza court’s use of “payment instruments” as a
surrogate for the definition of “monetary payment” can mislead readers as
well as cause errors in the analysis of “financial transactions.” Such an
error occurred when the Espinoza court overlooked “funds” as an
independent prong under the definition of “financial transaction.”

The Espinoza Court Improperly Applied the Doctrinal Rule of
Lenity
The Espinoza court’s application of the doctrinal rule of lenity is
improper because, as in Ulbricht, there is no statutory ambiguity. The
doctrinal rule of lenity directs courts to strictly construe criminal statutes
in a manner most favorable to defendants when the statutory language is
susceptible to different reasonable interpretations.96 More specifically,
“doubts regarding the meanings of terms . . . must be resolved in the
defendant’s favor” against the State.97 However, the rule of lenity is
“reserved . . . for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists
about a statute’s intended scope even after resort[ing] to ‘the language and
structure, legislative history, and motivating policies.’”98 That is, “this rule
of lenity is a canon of last resort and only applies if the [penal] statute
remains ambiguous after consulting traditional canons of statutory
construction.”99 A statute is ambiguous if the language is subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation and outcome; however, just because the
legislature may not have contemplated the applicability of the statute in a
particular situation does not make the statute ambiguous.100 “For a statute

96

16 FLA. CRIM. JUR. 2D CRIM. LAW, Construction in Favor of Accused § 14 (2017); see
also United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing United
States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2006), which stated, “[C]riminal statutes must
be strictly construed most favorably to the accused when they are subject to competing,
albeit reasonable, interpretations.”); Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (citing Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971), which stated that because “restraint must be exercised in
determining the breadth of conduct prohibited by a federal criminal stature out of concerns
regarding both the prerogatives of Congress and the need to give fair warning to those
whose conduct is affected,” the doctrinal rule of lenity requires “that when a criminal
statute is susceptible to two different interpretations – one more and one less favorable to
the defendant – ‘leniency’ requires that the court read it in the manner more favorable.”).
97
16 FLA. CRIM. JUR. 2D CRIM. LAW, Construction in Favor of Accused § 14 (2017).
98
United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
99
Paul v. State, 112 So. 3d 1188, 1195 (Fla. 2013); See also 16 FLA. CRIM. JUR. 2D CRIM.
LAW, Construction in Favor of Accused § 14 (2017) (stating “[a]bsent any ambiguity, the
rule of lenity does not apply.”).
100
See 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 115 (2014). “A statute can be unambiguous without
addressing every interpretative theory offered by a party. There is a difference between
ambiguity and unexpressed [legislative] intention.”
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to be unambiguous, it need only be plain to anyone reading an act that the
statute encompasses the conduct at issue.”101
The Espinoza court concluded that, although Arias conveyed that he
was planning to trade the Bitcoin from Espinoza for stolen credit card
numbers, Arias had not clearly represented that the cash that was being
paid to Espinoza was the proceeds of any illegal transaction.102 The
Espinoza court continued by stating that the money laundering statute
requires that Espinoza “undertake the transaction with the intent to
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity,” but finds the
vagueness of the term “promote” to be troublesome.103 Because there is no
statutory definition of the term “promote,” the Espinoza court looked to
the plain language meaning of the word “promoter,” which is “someone
who encourages or incites.”104 Concluding that the plain language meaning
of the word is too vague, the Espinoza court stated that “[t]his Court is
unwilling to punish a man for selling his property to another, when his
actions fall under a statute that is so vaguely written that even legal
professionals have difficulty finding a singular meaning.”105
The Ulbricht court also addressed the question of whether statutes
governing many of the charges that Ulbricht faced were ambiguous when
applied to his alleged conduct and concluded that application of the
doctrinal rule of lenity was inappropriate.106 The Ulbricht court rejected
Ulbricht’s argument for the doctrinal rule of leniency because Ulbricht had
not alleged
that a word or phrase in a statute . . . is susceptible to more
than one interpretation[, but rather Ulbricht] argues that
even if the elements of a . . . conspiracy are well known,
his particular conduct in designing and operating the
website does not clearly fall within what the statute is
intended to cover.107

101

Id.
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
103
Id.
104
Id. (citing Promoter, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed., 2014)).
105
Id.
106
United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 566–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
107
Id. at 566–67. The Ulbricht court clarified that, as a general principle, the doctrinal
rule of leniency does not require that clear, unambiguous statutes be applied in a lenient
manner; the doctrinal rule of leniency should only be applied if and when there is
ambiguity.
102
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The Ulbricht court concluded that “there is no statutory ambiguity and thus
no basis for the application of the rule of lenity.”108
Like in Ulbricht, dismissal based on the doctrinal rule of lenity was
improper in Espinoza because the term “promote” is not susceptible to
more than one interpretation such that the statute becomes ambiguous.
Even assuming that the Espinoza court was correct in concluding that
Arias had not clearly represented that the cash paid to Espinoza in the
Bitcoin exchange were the proceeds of any illegal transaction, it is
reasonable that Espinoza knew, or at least should have known, that the
cash, or a portion of the cash, was acquired by Arias through some illegal
activity, particularly considering Arias’ proposition to pay Espinoza for
the bitcoins with stolen credit card information.109 With such knowledge
regarding the origins of the cash paid in exchange for the bitcoins,
Espinoza encouraged or, at the very least, facilitated the carrying on of the
unlawful sale of stolen credit card information, even if Arias did not
explicitly state that the proceeds were the gained from the unlawful
activity. Additionally, just because Congress and the Florida Legislature
may not have contemplated the applicability of the Federal or Florida
Anti–Money Laundering Statutes in a particular situation involving
cryptocurrency does not make the statute ambiguous.110 “For a statute to
be unambiguous, it need only be plain to anyone reading an act that the
statute encompasses the conduct at issue.”111 In Espinoza, it is clear that
Espinoza’s supply of bitcoins “promoted” and enabled Arias’ fabricated
stolen credit card scheme in violation of the Florida Anti–Money
Laundering Statute; therefore, there is neither ambiguity nor grounds for
the application of the doctrinal rule of lenity.

Application of the Void–for–Vagueness Doctrine is Improper
Although not specifically cited to by the Espinoza court in its decision,
it is important to note that application of the void–for–vagueness doctrine
would be improper as a means of dismissing the money laundering
charges. The Espinoza court suggested a possible application of the void–
for–vagueness doctrine when it concluded that it was “unwilling to punish
108

Id. at 567; see also United States v. Budovsky, No. 13cr368 (DLC), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 127717, at *35 (rejecting arguments in favor of application of the rule of lenity
because “[h]aving considered the text, purpose, and legislative history . . . , there is no
ambiguity that would require resort to the rule of lenity.”).
109
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
110
See 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes §115 (2014) (stating that “[a] statute can be
unambiguous without addressing every interpretative theory offered by a party. There is a
difference between ambiguity and unexpressed [legislative] intention”).
111
Id.
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a man for selling his property to another, when his actions fall under a
statute that is so vaguely written that even legal professionals have
difficulty finding a singular meaning.”112 The void–for–vagueness
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.113 The underlying justification of the void–
for–vagueness doctrine is that no individual should be held criminally
liable or responsible for conduct that a reasonable person would not have
known to be prohibited under the applicable statute.114 In order for the
void–for–vagueness doctrine to apply, a court must hold that “the statute
is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that . . . it failed
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct was forbidden.”115 However, it is important to note that the statute
must be impermissibly vague in all of its applications for a valid void–for–
vagueness claim to be established.116
Although Bitcoin’s involvement in a defendant’s actions prosecuted
pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute complicates the
case’s analysis, application of the void–for–vagueness doctrine is
improper because Espinoza had fair notice that his contemplated conduct
was forbidden. In Ulbricht, the court stated that “the fact that a particular
defendant [Ulbricht] is the first to be prosecuted for novel conduct under
a pre–existing statutory scheme does not ipso facto mean that the statute
is ambiguous, . . . vague, or that [the defendant] has been deprived of
constitutionally appropriate notice.”117 Holding that the void–for–
vagueness doctrine is inapplicable, the Ulbricht court stated that a
vagueness challenge is avoided when a statute “define[s] a criminal
offense in a manner that ordinary people . . . understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.”118 Because “no person of ordinary
intelligence could believe that [Ulbricht’s] conduct, [the intentional
112

See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016) (emphasis added).
113
See 16 FLA. JUR. 2D Requirement of certainty; vagueness § 10 (2014) (stating that
“[t]he language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when
measured by common understanding and practice . . . .”).
114
See id.
115
See id.
116
See id. (stating that “[t]he legislature’s failure to define a statutory term does not in
and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague, nor does imprecise language
render a statute fatally vague, so long as the language conveys sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices”).
117
United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
118
See id. at 567.
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conduct to join with narcotics traffickers or computer hackers to help sell
illegal drugs or hack into computers], is somehow legal,” the Ulbricht
court concluded that there was nothing vague about the application of the
statute to Ulbricht’s alleged conduct.119
Similar to the Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute in Ulbricht, the
Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute in Espinoza is neither ambiguous
nor vague. As in Ulbricht, the Espinoza court must reason that no person
of ordinary intelligence could believe that Espinoza’s sale of bitcoins to
Arias to further facilitate a scheme involving the illegal sale of stolen
credit card information is somehow legal. Furthermore, the Florida Anti–
Money Laundering Statute must be impermissibly vague in all of its
applications for a valid void–for–vagueness claim to be established, which
it is not. The alleged vagueness of the term “promote” is improper as it has
been relied upon in many prior cases pursuant to the prosecution of money
laundering violations in Florida. Therefore, because the Florida Anti–
Money Laundering Statute provided Espinoza with sufficient notice that
his sale of bitcoins was prohibited and the Statute is not impermissibly
vague in all situations, a dismissal based on the void–for–vagueness
doctrine is inappropriate.

III. THE UNLAWFUL MONEY SERVICES BUSINESS CHARGE
The Espinoza court dismissed the Florida Business Services Statute
charge against Espinoza for reasons that depend on determining whether
Bitcoin qualifies as “monetary value.” By erroneously concluding that
bitcoins cannot be “money” or constitute “monetary value,” the Espinoza
court held that Espinoza could not be engaged in a money services
business because he was not acting as an “instrument seller.” Moreover,
the Espinoza court also concluded that Espinoza was not a “money
transmitter” under the Florida Business Services Statute because the sale
of bitcoins to Arias in exchange for cash was not done for the purpose of
transmitting the same by any means. Although this paper agrees that
Espinoza’s sale of bitcoins to Arias should not qualify Espinoza as a
“money transmitter” pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute, the
conclusion that Espinoza did not engage in a “money services business” is
nonetheless incorrect because bitcoins do constitute “monetary value”
and, therefore, qualify as “payment instruments.”
The Florida Business Services Statute states that “a person may not
engage in the business of a money services business . . . in this state unless
the person is licensed or exempted from licensure.”120 Similar to the two–
119
120

See id. at 568.
See FLA. STAT. § 560.125(1) (2016) (emphasis added).
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pronged definition of “financial transaction” in the Florida Anti–Money
Laundering Statute, the Florida Business Services Statute defines “money
services business” by providing mutually exclusive categories. The
Florida Business Services Statute defines “money services business” as “a
person . . . who acts as a payment instrument seller, foreign currency
exchanger, check cashier, or money transmitter.”121 For the purposes of
this analysis, such a definition means that an individual has engaged in the
business of a money services business in violation of the Florida Business
Services Statute if he either (1) acted as a “payment instrument seller” or
(2) acted as a “money transmitter.”
The statutory language of the Florida Business Services Statute
specifically defines “payment instrument seller” as “a corporation, limited
liability company, limited liability partnership, or foreign entity qualified
to do business in this state which sells a payment instrument,”122 and
defines a “payment instrument” as “a check, draft, warrant, money order,
traveler’s check, electronic instrument, or other instrument, payment of
money, or monetary value whether or not negotiable.”123 The Florida
Business Services Statute defines “money transmitter” as “a corporation,
limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or foreign entity
qualified to do business in this state which receives currency, monetary
value, or payment instruments for the purpose of transmitting the same by
any means, including transmission by wire, facsimile, electronic transfer,
courier, [or] the Internet . . . .”124 “Monetary value” is defined within the
Florida Business Services Statute as “a medium of exchange, whether or
not redeemable in currency.”125

Bitcoins Constitute “Money” or “Monetary Value”
Like “funds” pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute
charges, precedent was not available to the Espinoza court to determine
whether Bitcoin qualified as “monetary value” under the Florida Business
Services Statute charge. However, also like the money laundering charges,
there is substantial precedent in regards to how the federal courts have
121

FLA. STAT. § 560.103(22) (2016) (emphasis added).
§ 560.103(30).
123
See § 560.103(29)–(30).
124
§ 560.103(23) (emphasis added); see also § 560.125(5)(a) and (b). The statute
continues by stating that “a person who violates this section, if the violation involves: (a)
currency or payment instruments exceeding [three hundred dollars] $300 but less than
[twenty thousand dollars] $20,000 in any 12–month period, commits a felony of the third
degree . . . or (b) currency or payment instruments totaling or exceeding [twenty thousand
dollars] $20,000 but less than [one hundred thousand dollars] $100,000 in any 12–month
period, commits a felony of the second degree.”
125
§ 560.103(21).
122
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dealt with Bitcoin and its involvement in the unlawful engagement into a
money services business.126 In regards to the federal government’s
prohibition of an unlicensed money transmitting business, 18 U.S.C. §
1960 (the “Federal Money Services Business Statute”) states that
“[w]hoever knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or
owns all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, shall be
fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”127 The Federal
Money Services Business Statute defines “unlicensed money transmitting
business” and “money transmitting” differently than the Florida Business
Services Statute defines “money services business” and “money
transmitter.”128 However, because the Florida Legislature enacted the
Florida Business Services Statute largely based upon the Federal Money
Services Business Statute,129 Congress’ legislative intent in enacting the
Federal Money Services Business Statute should be considered when
analyzing the Florida Business Services Statute.
The legislative history of the Federal Money Services Business Statute
is clear. It was enacted to serve as an anti–money laundering statute;
particularly intended to stop or thwart the movement of illegitimate funds
connected to the drug trade.130 At the time of enactment, Congress feared
that drug dealers would be begin to more frequently utilize “non–bank
financial institutions” in order to convert illegitimate cash and currency
into “monetary instruments,” thereby allowing the drug dealers to more
easily launder the proceeds of any illicit transaction.131 That is, Federal
Money Services Business Statute “was enacted to address the fact that
‘money launderers with illicit profits ha[d] found new avenues of entry
into the financial system [and prevent innovative ways of transmitting
126

See United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 707–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United
States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
127
18 U.S.C. §1960(a) (2006).
128
An “unlicensed money transmitting business” is “a money transmitting business
which affects interstate or foreign commerce in any manner or degree and . . . involves the
transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to have been
derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful
activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1) (emphasis added). A “money transmitting” to include
“transferring funds on behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited
to transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, facsimile, or
courier . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2).
129
“By express action, the Florida Legislature has directly tied federal money laundering
and [unlawful money services business] violations to the code. For example, [pursuant to
Fla. Stat. § 560.111(1)(d)], it is a violation . . . to engage in an act that violates the Federal
Anti–Money Laundering Statute [and the Federal Money Services Business Statute] . . . ,”
See Israel Reyes, Florida’s Anti–Money Laundering Statutes, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1999, at
66, 67.
130
See Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545–46.
131
See id.
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such money].”132 Moreover, Congress intended the Federal Money
Services Business Statute to modernize the law governing money
laundering and to safeguard from any evolving threats, which is made
obvious by the statute’s broad language which makes it applicable to any
business involved in transferring “funds . . . by any and all means.”133
The Espinoza court dismissed the unlawful money services business
charge against Espinoza after it concluded that Bitcoin could not fall under
the statutory definition of “payment instrument” because virtual or digital
currency is not specifically included in the definition, nor does Bitcoin fall
under one of the categories defined within the “payment instrument.”134
While acknowledging that Bitcoin did share some qualities in common
with what people generally refer to as money, the Espinoza court
concluded that “Bitcoin has a long way to go before it is the equivalent of
money.”135 The Espinoza court reasoned that while Bitcoin could be
exchanged for items of value, (1) Bitcoin is not a commonly used means
of exchange because it is accepted by some, but not all, merchants or
service providers, (2) the value of Bitcoin fluctuates wildly due to the
uncertainty of Bitcoin’s future value and lack of stabilization, and (3)
Bitcoin has a limited ability to act as a store of value.136 Furthermore,
Judge Pooler reasoned that Bitcoin differed from “money” in that sense
that it was a decentralized system, thereby not backed by anything, and did
not have tangible wealth like cash or gold.137 Therefore, Judge Pooler
concluded that Espinoza’s sale of Bitcoin did not constitute the operation
of a money services business and dismissed the count.138 While these
characteristics of Bitcoin may be of some consideration when determining
the differences between Bitcoin and traditional government–supported
currencies, they are not determinative characteristics of “money” or
“monetary value.” “Monetary value” is defined within the Florida
Business Services Statute as “a medium of exchange, whether or not
redeemable in currency.”139 Contrary to the analysis conducted by the
Espinoza court, the Florida Business Services Statute does not require, nor
even contemplate, that an item of monetary value be commonly accepted
132

United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 707–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
See Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 546; see also Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 708 (stating
that the Court must give effect to the broad language Congress employed – namely that 18
U.S.C. § 1960 “applies to any business involved in transferring ‘funds by any and all
means’”).
134
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
135
Id. at 6.
136
See id. at 5–6.
137
See id. at 6.
138
See id.
139
FLA. STAT. § 560.103(21) (2016).
133
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by merchants or service providers, stable, or centralized. Therefore, in
order for bitcoins to fall under the express statutory definition of
“monetary value,” and therefore within the scope of “payment
instruments,” it must be determined that bitcoins are “medium of
exchange, whether or not redeemable in currency.”140
In United States v. Murgio,141 United States District Court Judge for
the Southern District of New York, Alison J. Nathan, directly addressed
the flawed “monetary value” analysis of the Espinoza court and concluded,
contrary to the Espinoza court, that bitcoins are “monetary value” pursuant
to the Florida Business Services Statute.142 The Murgio court addressed
the Espinoza decision because Murgio was being indicted pursuant to the
Federal Money Services Business Statute, which required an analysis of
the Florida Business Services Statute in order to determine if Murgio’s
business operation was indeed “unlicensed.”143 The Murgio court reasoned
that “[b]itcoins can be accepted as ‘payment for goods and services’ or
bought ‘directly from an exchange with a bank account.’”144 Additionally,
the Murgio court concluded that bitcoins function as pecuniary resources
and that Bitcoin is “used as a medium of exchange and a means of
payment.”145 Because Bitcoin “can be easily purchased in exchange for
ordinary currency, act as a denominator of value, and [is] used to conduct
financial transactions,”146 the Murgio court concludes that Bitcoin falls

140

See id.
See United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Anthony
Murgio and his co–defendants were charged with a nine–count indictment, including the
operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960.
It was alleged that Murgio and his co–defendants operated an unlawful Bitcoin exchange
website called “Coin.mx” and bribed the chairman of the board of a federal credit union,
Trevon Gross, to obscure the illegal nature of the website. The Murgio court held that
bitcoins are “funds” within the plain meaning of the term and, therefore, fall within the
statutory definition of “funds” under the Federal Money Services Business Statute.
142
See id. at 712–16. District Judge Nathan reasoned that, although the Federal Money
Services Business Statute does not define what qualifies as “money” other than to state that
it includes “funds,” funds are intended to mean “pecuniary resources, which are generally
accepted as a medium of exchange or means of payment.” This is because Bitcoin “can be
easily purchased in exchange for ordinary currency, act as a denominator of value, and [is]
used to conduct financial transaction.”
143
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) (2006). See also Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 712–14. The
Federal Money Services Business Statute determines if a money transmitting business is
unlicensed by considering whether the business operates “without an appropriate money
transmitting license in a State where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a
felony.” § 1960(b)(1)(A).
144
Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (citing Getting started with Bitcoin, BITCOIN,
https://bitcoin.org/en/getting-started (last visited Sept. 16, 2016)).
145
Id.
146
Id. (quoting United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
141
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within the Florida Business Services Statute’s express definition of
“monetary value.”147

It was Improper to Rely on IRS Notice 2014–21
Incorrectly concluding that Espinoza did not qualify as a “payment
instrument seller” because Bitcoin did not fall under the statutory
definition of “payment instrument,” the Espinoza court improperly cited
and relied on Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) Notice 2014–21.148
Notice 2014–21 declared that “[t]he federal government . . . has decided
to treat virtual currency as property for tax purposes.”149 Notice 2014–21,
however, does not address the question of whether bitcoins constitute
“payment instruments” pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute
and is irrelevant to the analysis.150 It seems logical to conclude that the
Espinoza court erred when it sought guidance from a federal government
regulatory agency and found its directives to be persuasive, but failed to
find persuasive, or at least consider with proper regard, the abundant
federal case law conducting a parallel analysis on the Florida Business
Services Statute’s model statutes.
147

Id. at 712 (citing FLA. STAT. § 560.103(21) (2016). See also id. at 713 (“[Because]
the Espinoza court is the first Florida court to have considered the reach of Chapter 560
[the Florida Business Services Statute] in the context of Bitcoin, and neither the state’s
Supreme Court nor the District Courts of Appeal have weighed in[,] [t]his Court is . . . not
bound by the decision in Espinoza, though it owes the decision ‘proper regard.’”).
148
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016) (citing
§ 560.103(29)); see United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 713 (S.D.N.Y 2016)
(“[W]ith respect to the meaning of ‘payment instrument,’ the only reason the Espinoza
court cites for concluding that bitcoins are not ‘payment instruments’ is that the IRS ‘has
decided to treat virtual currency as property for federal tax purposes.’”).
149
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016); I.R.S. Notice 2014–
21, 2014–16 I.R.B. 938.
150
United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he IRS
Notice . . . makes clear that it ‘addresses only U.S. federal tax consequences of transactions
in, or transactions that use, convertible virtual currency.’”) (quoting I.R.S. Notice 2014–
21, 2014–16 I.R.B. 938). See also United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (addressing Ulbricht’s argument that bitcoins cannot form the basis for a
money laundering conspiracy, the Ulbricht court rejected the application of Notice 2014–
21 because “neither the IRS nor FinCEN has addressed the question of whether a “financial
transaction” can occur with Bitcoins”). See also United States v. Budovsky, No. 12cr368
(DLC), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127717, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015). Pursuant to the
Federal Anti–Money Laundering Statute, the Budovsky court rejected the argument that
virtual currency is not “funds” in light of Notice 2014–21 because “[t]hese documents are
inapposite and do not suggest that the term ‘funds’ should not be read to encompass virtual
currencies.” Id. at *36 (citing I.R.S. Notice 2014–21, 2014–16 I.R.B. 938; Ulbricht, 31 F.
Supp. 3d at 569).
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The Murgio court specifically rejected the Espinoza court’s reference
to Notice 2014–21 when deciding that bitcoins are not “payment
instruments” for two reasons. First, an argument that bitcoins fail to fall
under the statutory definition of “payment instruments” based on Notice
2014–21 “ignores the fact that [the Florida Business Services Statute]
defines ‘payment instrument’ as including ‘monetary value.’”151 Second,
the Espinoza court failed to acknowledge that “[t]he IRS’s classification
is divorced from the basic statutory interpretation question at issue . . . .”152
Therefore, like how the Murgio court remained persuaded that the Florida
Business Services Statute applied to persons and businesses that
conducted transactions using Bitcoin,153 this paper fails to identify or
acknowledge the relevance of Notice 2014–21 in addressing the question
of whether Bitcoin constitutes a “payment instrument.”

Espinoza Qualifies as a “Payment Instrument Seller”
Following the statutory structure of the Florida Business Services
Statute, because bitcoins constitute “monetary value” and “payment
instrument” is defined, among other categories, as “payment of money or
monetary value whether or not negotiable,” Bitcoin qualifies as a
“payment instrument.”154 Furthermore, because the Florida Business
Services Statute defines “money services business” to include “a person
who acts as a payment instrument seller”155 and a “payment instrument
seller” is something “qualified to do business in this state which sells a
payment instrument,”156 Espinoza must be considered a “payment
instrument seller” and, therefore, a person who unlawfully engaged in the
business of a “money services business.”157
The hesitation of the Espinoza court to prosecute Espinoza’s
transactions involving Bitcoin may be partly because of a lack of
precedent. However, it is established under Florida law that statutes may
“apply to new situations, cases, conditions, things, subjects, [or]
methods . . . coming into existence subsequent to its enactment; [provided
h]owever, [these new aspects] must be in the same general class as those

151

Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Order Granting Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v. Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 4–5 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
dismissed July 22, 2016)).
152
Id. at 713–14.
153
See id. at 714.
154
FLA. STAT. § 560.103(29) (2016). Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (“Because bitcoins
are ‘monetary value,’ they are also ‘payment instruments.’”).
155
§ 560.103(22) (emphasis added).
156
§ 560.103(30).
157
§ 560.103(29).
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treated in the statute.”158 That is, such new situations, cases, conditions,
and the like must reasonably be “within the general purview, scope,
purpose, and policy of the statute.”159 In light of the Florida Business
Services Statute’s text and purpose, it seems clear that bitcoins fall within
the purview and scope of the Florida Business Services Statute because
bitcoins qualify as payment instruments. Additionally, it is also well–
established that “motion to dismiss charges against a defendant should
rarely be granted, and granted only when the facts and inferences arising
there from, taken in the light most favorable to the State, do not establish
a prima facie case.”160 Under this standard, the Espinoza court should not
have granted Espinoza’s pre–trial motion to dismiss even if it remained
uncertain about whether bitcoins constituted “monetary value” and,
therefore, “payment instruments.”

IV. CONCLUSION
The Espinoza court incorrectly dismissed all three counts pursuant to
the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute and Florida Business Services
Statute because of flawed analyses of both statutes. Although the Espinoza
court correctly concluded that bitcoins do not qualify as “monetary
instruments” pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute, the
Espinoza court conducted a flawed analysis by using its reasoning of
“payment instrument” pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute as
a surrogate for the statutory definition of “monetary instruments” and
completely ignored the first prong of the statutory definition of “financial
transaction,” which included the term “funds.”161 If the Espinoza court had
not overlooked the term “funds” within the definition of “financial
transaction” of the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute, it likely
would have reached the conclusion that Espinoza’s Bitcoin transactions
qualified as “financial transactions” based on the same analyses that
multiple federal courts have conducted. Furthermore, the Espinoza court’s
application of the doctrinal rule of lenity and void–for–vagueness is
improper because there is no ambiguity as to the Florida Anti–Money
Laundering Statute’s language or its statutory definitions.
158

48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 125 (2004) (“When a statute is expressed in general terms
and in words of the present tense, it is generally construable to apply not only to things and
conditions existing at the time of its passage, but also will be given a prospective effect and
made to apply to such as come into existence thereafter.”).
159
Id.
160
State v. Gensler, 929 So. 2d 27, 29 (3d Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations
omitted).
161
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 6–7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
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Additionally, the Espinoza court improperly concluded that bitcoins
did not qualify as “monetary value” because the court failed to
acknowledge that, pursuant to the Florida Business Services Statute,
“monetary value” is “a medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable
in currency.”162 Rather than analyzing whether Bitcoin is a medium of
exchange, the Espinoza court reasoned that Bitcoin is not a commonly
used means of exchange, the value of Bitcoin fluctuates wildly, and
Bitcoin has a limited ability to act as a store of value.163 This ignores the
fact that Bitcoin, although possibly an uncommon and volatile medium of
exchange, remains a medium of exchange. If the Espinoza court had
concluded that Bitcoin is a medium of exchange, Bitcoin would clearly
qualify as a “payment instrument” pursuant to the Florida Business
Services Statute and Espinoza would constitute a “payment instrument
seller.” Therefore, Espinoza’s Bitcoin transactions to Arias must fall
within the purview of the Florida Business Services Statute and a
preliminary dismissal of such charges by the Espinoza court was
unwarranted.
The Third District Court of Appeal should reverse and remand the
decision of the Espinoza court to be consistent with the well–established
rules of statutory interpretation. Such rules of statutory interpretation
demand both an appropriate plain meaning analysis divorced from the
influence of the irrelevant IRS Notice 2014–21 as well as an analysis of
the legislative intent in enacting the relevant statutes.

Public Policy Importance
The Espinoza court’s decision to dismiss the Florida Anti–Money
Laundering Statute and the Florida Business Services Statute charges
creates a precedent in Florida that leaves a gaping hole in the state’s ability
to regulate and prosecute illicit acts involving cryptocurrencies. Florida’s
inability to regulate or prosecute acts that would ordinarily constitute
money laundering, but now fall outside the purviews of both the Florida
Anti–Money Laundering Statute and the Florida Business Services Statute
because cryptocurrencies are utilized, opens the door for tech–savvy
criminals. Such precedence cannot be allowed to stand and must be
overturned by the Third District Court of Appeal or addressed by the
Florida legislature.

162

FLA. STAT. § 560.103(17) (2016).
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 5–6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016).
163
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Domestic Legislative and Judicial Action
In Espinoza, Judge Pooler calls for legislative action to clarify the
statutory language of the applicable Florida statutes.164 Although no
legislative measures have yet been taken within Florida to directly address
cryptocurrencies pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money Laundering Statute
and the Florida Business Services Statute, two members of the United
States Congress have established the new Congressional Blockchain
Caucus, which “will study Bitcoin and Blockchain technology.”165
Congressmen Jared Polis and Mick Mulvaney organized the
Congressional Blockchain Caucus “to educate lawmakers on Capitol Hill
about cryptocurrency . . . and the [legal] issues surrounding it.”166
However, any legislation that may result from the efforts of the
Congressional Blockchain Caucus will not be binding on the Florida state
courts when they analyze issues pursuant to the Florida Anti–Money
Laundering Statute and the Florida Business Services Statute.
As mentioned, Espinoza has been appealed to Florida’s Third District
Court of Appeal. Although this appeal will likely provide greater clarity
in regards the applicability of money laundering statutes to actions
involving cryptocurrency, the Supreme Court of Florida will not have an
opportunity to speak to the issue until another District Court of Appeal
renders a decision that directly conflicts with the Third District Court of
Appeal decision after the decision is rendered.167

Bitcoin in Foreign Policies
The United States and Florida are not the only governing bodies that
are grappling with the new legal challenges that cryptocurrencies are
presenting. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that Bitcoin
exchange transactions should be exempt from applicable value–added
164

See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14–2923, at 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dismissed July 22, 2016) (“Without legislative
action geared towards a much[–]needed update to the particular language within [these]
statute[s], this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law . . . .”).
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167
See Supreme Court of Florida, FLORIDA COURTS, http://www.flcourts.org/floridacourts/supreme-court.stml (last visited Aug. 27, 2017).The Supreme Court of Florida has
mandatory jurisdiction and, therefore, must review (1) final orders imposing death
sentences, (2) district court decisions declaring a Florida statute unconstitutional, (3) bond
validations, and (4) select orders of the Public Service Commission involving utility rates
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taxes.168 This ECJ decision treats Bitcoin similarly to currency, bank notes
and coins used as legal tender.169 The ECJ made this decision only about
one month after the United States Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) reached a contradictory conclusion, which deemed
Bitcoin to be a commodity.170 Importantly, the ECJ’s decision “squarely
places [B]itcoin and similar digital currencies within the ambit of
‘financial transactions’ [under certain European Union Directives].”171
Countries around the world, however, have also expressed negative
views of digital currencies and implemented bans of varying degrees.172
Most notably, countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Bangladesh have
implemented total bans on the use of Bitcoin, while countries like China,
Sweden, India, and Russia have quasi–bans on the cryptocurrency.173
Canada and Australia are still deliberating on how to treat Bitcoin
legally.174
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